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Abstract 
The paper discusses how the resource contro l hypothesis 
introduced earlier by the author accounts for the rather 
mysterious fact that English articles are rendered in Slavonic-
languages by word order and vice versa. The def ini te versus 
indefini te d is t inct ion is viewed as a manifestation of the variable 
depth of nominal phrase processing. The depth of processing is 
determined by the availabil i ty of resources, which is indirect ly 
control led by the speaker w i t h sufficient precision; articles 
appear to be on ly some of several resource contro l devices 
available in natural language. 
Articles 
Teaching the proper use of articles to the students whose 
native language does not posses them is one of the most d i f f i cu l t 
tasks. Despite the ef for t of both the teachers of English who are 
and who are not native speakers, no satisfactory teaching 
methods have been developed. 
In hope to f ind some hints useful for teaching English to 
Polish students, an experiment was performed by Smolska 
(1976). A short English text was deprived of all articles, and the 
underscore character was inserted at all the potent ial places of 
their occurence. Next , 4 educated native speakers of English 
wil l ing to be the subjects of the experiments were found in 
Warsaw; the reader should appreciate that it was not a tr ivial 
task. The subjects were independently asked to f i l l in the articles 
when appropriate. The result was rather surprising: the subjects 
agreed w i t h themselves and the author of the original text in 
86 % cases. 
The Smolska's experiment strongly suggest that the semantic 
impact of articles is negligible, but of course it does not prove 
the case. Unfor tunate ly , the native speakers of English are too 
scarce in Poland to allow an experiment on a larger scale. 
Therefore the onus lies on those opponents which have no 
d i f f i cu l ty to gain cooperat ion of suff icient number of native 
speakers. For the purpose of the present paper I simply assume 
the claim to be true. 
Let us notice now that articles are not just historical 
remnants, but emerged relatively lately as a new linguistic 
mechanism, so it is natural to assume that they serve some 
specific purpose. I f they do not affect WHICH meaning is 
assigned to an utterance, they may influence HOW the meaning 
is assigned. In other words, it may be the case that articles 
cont ro l in some respect the process of comput ing the meaning. 
Resource contro l hypothesis 
The resource cont ro l hypothesis has been formulated in (Bien 
1980) as a further development of the mul t ip le environments 
model of natural language advocated e.g. in (Bien- 1975, 
1976a,b). Below we discuss br ief ly on ly those aspects of the 
hypothesis wh ich are relevant for the present paper. 
We accept the wide-spread assumption that in format ion in 
memory is clustered in to frames. At every moment some frames 
are in the focus of at tent ion; the saliency of other frames may 
be represented by an appropriately defined distance f rom the 
focus of at tent ion. Changes in saliency are viewed as a suitable 
displacement; such a displacement requires always some t ime 
and other resources. For more details of the proposed 
DISPLACEMENT M O D E L OF MEMORY see (Bien 1980). 
A frame in the str ict sense describes a specific object or 
not ion, e.g. a specific copy of a specific book; more general 
in format ion is stored in frame prototypes. Instant iat ing a 
pro to type usually requires memory search to locate the relevant 
data; in consequence, it is a process w i t h substantial demands 
for resources. The frame prototypes are of course interrelated, 
e.g. the proto type for a book contains a slot fo r its author, the 
prototype for an author contains a slot for his/her books etc. 
The interrelat ion is represented by means of frame pointers. 
They are just data structures al lowing to locate the appropriate 
prototype when needed. Construct ing a frame pointer requires a 
negligible amount of resources. 
We assume that there is some l im i t for the human language 
processor capacity and that the linguistic processes must 
compete for resources. The lower level proceses (acoustic, 
phonetic and syntactic analysis) are data-l imited processes, whi le 
the higher level processes (semantic and pragmatic processes, 
including memory search and spontaneous inferences) are 
resource-limited (Norman,Bobrow 1975). Data-l imited processes 
must have higher pr io r i ty , otherwise the resource-limited 
processes wou ld use up all the resources available; in 
consequence, the semantic and pragmatic processing uses only 
the resources left by the lower level processes. 
A nominal phrase in an utterance is always transformed at f i rst 
in to a frame pointer. Depending on the availabil i ty of resources, 
the pointer can be developed in to a pro to type, accomodating 
some addit ional in format ion contained in the utterance. The 
proto type can be then instantiated by memory search. F inal ly , 
the frame instance can be displaced toward the focus of 
at tent ion. In other words, the availabil i ty of resources 
determines the depth of processing for a given nominal phrase. 
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Contro l l ing the depth of processing 
Most devices for contro l l ing the al location of resources for the 
resource-limited processes and, in consequence, contro l l ing the 
depth of processing seem to be language universalis, but in 
di f ferent languages they are used to di f ferent extent. 
The most general way of allocating the resources consists in 
choosing for a phrase an appropriate distance f r o m the 
beginning of the utterance; we wi l l call i t the t ime ordinate 
principle. Putt ing a phrase close to the beginning results in the 
early in i t ia t ion of its processing, and gives it more chances to 
collect the appropriate amount of resources. We assume that the 
scheduling of the resource-limited processes is governed by the 
preference for determinist ic processes (Bien 1980:4, Kowalski 
1979:100). This strategy distributes the resources to the 
memory search, the inferences and the focusing in the 
proport ions depending on the context of computa t ion . I f a 
phrase is placed at the beginning of a sentence, the global effect 
is determined by several factors. We w i l l ment ion here only the 
extreme cases. The most typical one is when the phrase refers to 
some in format ion known already, which is then retrieved and 
brought to the focus of a t tent ion; the in format ion f rom 
memory becomes available soon enough to influence the 
procesing of the rest of the sentence. If the phrase introduces 
new in fo rmat ion , as in (Bien 1980:15, Szwedek 1981:74) 
(1) A man was coming. 
the inferencing tries to establish its relation to the known 
in format ion; on the other hand the new in format ion becomes 
the focus of a t tent ion. 
Another case is represented by English cleft sentences of the 
type 
(2) I t was John who did i t . 
where memory search is usually not needed and all the resources 
are used for focusing and spontaneous inferencing, which results 
in the effect of strong emphasis. As it can be seen now, the 
claim that there is a universal tendency to put the given or 
def ini te in format ion at the beginning of the utterance 
(Ca rk Clark 1977:548) is just a rough approximat ion of the 
reali ty. 
Another way of contro l l ing the resources consists in using 
demonstratives. We take for granted that the pr imary use of 
demonstratives is to draw the hearer's at tent ion to physical 
objects in his environment. The hearer's strategy to process 
demonstratives is therefore to assign the top p r io r i t y to the task 
(the object pointed should be located as soon as possible, 
because e.g. it can be moving and the speaker's descript ion may 
soon become obsolete). Succesful processing of demonstratives 
requires accomodation of the in format ion perceived and not 
contained in the utterance, therefore the nominal plArase 
containing a demonstrative should be processed at least at the 
level of frame instances. The speaker's strategy for using 
demonstratives includes the requirement for the adequate 
descript ion of the object, so the hearer may assume the 
descript ion to be precise and not requir ing any addit ional 
inferences. Now it should be noted that what we actually 
perceive e.g. visually is on ly a l i t t le spot (the data f r o m the 
retinas of our eyes) in our mental image of the environment, so 
the hearer's strategy can be formulated simply as: locate the 
memory representation of the object, assuming that the 
descript ion is precise, and store the retrieved in format ion in a 
frame instance as qu ick ly as possible. In consequence, both in 
English and Slavonic languages the nominal phrase containing 
demonstratives may refer to the in format ion given earlier in the 
text; cf. e.g. (Hawkins 1978:149). 
The next method of contro l l ing the depth of processing 
exploits some properties of numerals. The primary use of 
numerals expresses the cardinal i ty, but the side-effect of it is the 
low level of processing: it is impossible to construct 1000 frame 
instances for the phrase " thousand soldiers", it would be useless 
to construct 10 frame instances for " t e n soldiers", so by analogy 
no separate instances are created (unless forced by other 
reasons) for " t w o soldiers" although it is feasible. We claim that 
the analogy holds also for the numeral meaning one, i.e. that a 
nominal phrase containing the numeral " o n e " is not processed 
deeper than to the level of frame pointer or a single frame 
prototype. It explains why the numeral is occasionally used 
both in English and Slavonic languages to signal new 
in format ion. 
The next very important method applies only to spoken 
language but had, at least for English, a far-reaching 
consequences also for wr i t ten language: it is the sentence stress. 
When we assign the sentence stress to a phrase, we pronounce it 
more clearly and in a longer t ime span than usually (the claim is 
based on ly on my in tu i t i on , but 1 am not aware of any evidence 
contradict ing i t ) . The clearer pronounciat ion makes the task of 
the acoustic analysis easier, so it consumes less resources; the 
larger t ime span generally increases the availability of resources. 
The global result is the substantial increase of resources available 
for the higher level processes. As usual, the resources can be 
allocated to them in several ways. Typica l ly , the inferences and 
focusing provide the effect of emphasis. On the other hand, 
unstressing a phrase or a word deprives it of resources. To the 
best of my knowledge, in all languages articles originated f rom 
unstressed numerals or pronouns (personal or demonstratives); 
articles has therefore much in common w i t h their source. Our 
treatment of articles, which intends to incorporate the results of 
(Hawkins 1978) by interpret ing them in the framework of (Bien 
1980), w i l l account fo r this fact. 
The def in i te article in English originated f rom demonstratives; 
depriving demonstratives of resources by unstressing them does 
not allow to assign the top p r io r i t y , but sti l l the task is the 
frame instance depth of processing. The process of establishing 
the frame instance takes now longer, and in the meantime some 
useful results of spontaneous inferences may become available; 
therefore it would be uneff icient to stick to the precision 
requirement. The frame instance may be needed to accomodate 
either the in format ion retrieved f rom the memory (the 
anaphoric u e of def ini te art icle) or fo r the elaborate descript ion 
contained in the utterance (the forward-point ing use), or for 
other reasons (e.g. the generic use). The indef ini te article 
originated f r o m the numeral ; its func t ion is s imply to signal that 
shallow processing is suff ic ient. In the next section we w i l l t r y 
to demonstrate that the Hawkins' not ions of inclusiveness and 
exclusiveness are just the manifestat ion of the di f ferent depth of 
processing. 
Examples 
As it is always r isky to design sophisticated examples in a 
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non-native language we take both the examples and their 
meanings f rom (Hawkins 1978); we preserve the original 
numbering of examples. 
At f irst we wi l l il lustrate the basic uses of articles. 
(3.02) Fred was discussing an interesting book in his class. 1 
went to discuss the book w i t h h im afterwards. 
In the first sentence we have a typical use of indefinite article, 
which signals that the processing level of the frame pointer to 
the book prototype would be sufficient; the at tr ibute 
' ' interesting'' may be attached to the pointer or, if there are 
resources available, it may be accomodated in the instance of 
the book prototype located by means of the pointer. In both 
cases the nominal phrase gets only shallow processing. In the 
second sentence we have an anaphoric use of definite article; the 
book prototype is used to create a frame instance, then the 
memory is searched in an attempt to further instantiate i t . The 
antecedent pointer or frame instance is easily found and merged 
w i th the instance which init iated the search. 
(3.03) Fred was discussing an interesting book in his class. He 
is f r iendly wi th the author. 
In the second sentence we have the associative anaphoric use of 
definite article. The frame instance for the author is created and 
the memory is searched as before. However, this time only one 
of its slots (" the author of what ") wi l l be succesfully matched 
against the frame instance in the memory. 
(3 .02" ) Fred was discussing an interesting book in his class. 1 
went to discuss a book w i t h him afterwards. 
In this text we have two separate pointers or frame prototypes 
(i.e. frame instances containing only the informat ion stored in 
the prototype) for " b o o k " . Hawkins (1987:87) is wrong 
claiming that the phrases cannot refer to the same book, as the 
cont inuat ion is possible " I t appeared later to be the same book ' ' 
which results in collapsing two frame instances into a single one. 
(3 .03" ) Fred was discussing an interesting book in his class. He 
is fr iendly w i th an author. 
In Hawkins' terms, "an author' ' (and "a b o o k " in the preceding 
example) is a non-located ( in the shared knowledge of speaker 
and hearer) specific indefini te, which EXCLUDE (this is for 
Hawkins the essential property of indefinite reference) an 
inf in i te number of potential referents. This sophisticated mental 
construct ion decribes, in our opin ion, the simple fact that a 
shallowly processed nominal phrase represents an object 
unrelated to other instances of the same prototype stored in the 
memory, unless such a relation is established by some addit ional 
ef for t ; i t is not wo r th mentioning that an unl imited number of 
the new instances of the same prototype may be created later. 
The exclusiveness of indef ini te reference is more intui t ive in the 
fo l lowing example: 
(4.16) I've just deckled to inspect a house. I decided not to 
buy it because a roof was leaking. 
Hawkins claims that "a r o o f ' ' cannot refer to the roof of the 
house mentioned, because it has to exclude at least one other 
possible referent; as there is on ly one roof talked about, the 
exclusion is impossible and results in the unacceptabil ity of the 
text . In our op in ion, (4.16) is fu l ly analogous to (3.02') and 
(3 .03" ) , the difference consisting only in the fact that even a 
temporary assumption of the non-coreferentiality o f "a r o o f 
w i t h the inferred roof of "a house" leads to the incoherence of 
the text under consideration. In consequence, we accept the 
exclusiveness rule only as an interplay of the shallow depth of 
processing w i th general coherence rules. Our posit ion is 
addit ional ly supported by the Hawkins' observation that the 
exclusiveness condi t ion disappears w i t h the verbs " t o have", " t o 
be" and the set-existential verbs: 
(4.137) 1 have a head. 
(4.145) There is a roof on my house. 
(4.158) Do you remember the other day 1 was talking about a 
student called Smith ? 
Such sentences may be called attention-shif t ing, because usually 
they do not introduce new in format ion, but change the saliency 
of the already known facts. According to Hawkins, the essential 
property of def ini te reference is its 1NCLUSIVENESS (which in 
case of singular count nouns turns into uniqueness), e.g. 
(3.175) Fred brought the wickets in after the game of cricket, 
" is understood as making a claim about all the wickets in 
quest ion". We th ink the property originates f rom the fact that 
the deep processing of a nominal phrase fu l ly associates it w i th 
earlier mentions of the referent. 
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